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A Lesson in Politics: Some Remarks on Leo Strauss’  





Abstract: In the first paragraph of this paper, I tackle the 
problem represented by Leo Strauss’ work on Aristo-
phanes’ comedies Socrates and Aristophanes. In the sec-
ond and third part, I analyze the character of Socrates’ 
atheism, and the influence of natural science on his un-
belief. The fourth part addresses the tension between the 
fundamental requirements of the city and the require-
ments of the philosophical way of life. The final section 
dwells on the peculiar meaning of Aristophanes’ political 
lesson. 
 




1. Leo Strauss’ “real work” 
 
 To my knowledge, the philosopher who stated the 
case for poetry more forcefully than anyone else during 
the last two centuries was Friedrich Nietzsche in the Birth 
of Tragedy. In a sense, he once again opened the ancient 
quarrel between poetry and philosophy, or poetry and sci-
ence1. His recovery of poetry was related to a sort of po-
litical action or spiritual warfare2, and this should be of no 
surprise, since even the classical quarrel between poetry 
and philosophy was of political significance. Leo Strauss’ 
Socrates and Aristophanes faces the same issue, appar-
ently taking the side of poetry. We can ask what Strauss’ 
intention might have been, and as a preliminary hypoth-
esis I would assume that he was working on a renewal of 
political philosophy3; but for now it seems better, follow-
ing his advice, to start from the surface. 
 Socrates and Aristophanes is a truly unique book4. 
Firstly, it is the only book in which Strauss analyzes, one 
by one, all the works of a single author. Only Thoughts on 
Machiavelli is comparable, aside from the fact that it does 
not analyze all the works of Machiavelli one after the 
other, but is merely a close reading of the Prince and the 
Discourses. Secondly, Socrates and Aristophanes is a 
commentary on the works of a comic poet, not a commen-
tary devoted to the work of a political philosopher. Nor is 
it even a commentary devoted to the work of a political 
historian, as in the case of the chapter on Thucydides in 
The City and Man. The title, however, points to two dis-
tinct figures: Socrates and Aristophanes. Socrates is the 
philosopher traditionally recognized as the originator of 
political philosophy and the philosopher who famously 
wrote nothing. In fact, we only ever deal with Socrates 
through the writings of someone else: Plato’s Socrates or 
Xenophon’s Socrates. As in the case of Xenophon’s 
Socrates or Farabi’s Plato, one could speak of Aristo-
phanes’ Socrates, yet this is not how Strauss entitles his 
“real work”5. Why? 
 Strauss maintains that Aristophanes’ comedy is the 
source to which we must turn in order to rediscover the 
pre-Socratic Socrates (pp. 4-6)6 who is simply a natural 
philosopher and not yet a sophisticated political philoso-
pher (pp. 311-14). I am therefore tempted to say that the 
Socrates of Socrates and Aristophanes is neither the 
Socrates of Aristophanes nor the Socrates of, say, Xeno-
phon. He is simply the unpolitical Socrates, that is, the 
unpolitical philosopher par excellence. 
 Now, why does Strauss need to recover the figure of 
the pre-Socratic Socrates? The reason for this is the crisis 
of the tradition of political philosophy7. This urgent need 
prompted Strauss to read The Clouds of Aristophanes, as 
we are told at the beginning of Socrates and Aristo-
phanes. The crisis of our tradition forces us to return to its 
origins, to disinter its roots, to start over (p. 3). Our tradi-
tion vouches for the possibility and necessity of political 
philosophy, and in the nineteenth century our tradition 
was radically challenged. According to Strauss, the peak 
of this criticism is the attack of Nietzsche on Socrates and 
Plato: Nietzsche attacks the philosopher who, according 
to our tradition, founded political philosophy (pp. 6-8). 
The first, and perhaps the most important, formulation of 
Nietzsche’s critique is developed in his first book, The 
Birth of Tragedy, where the German philosopher ad-
dresses some of the flaws which brought Aristophanes to 
his critique of the pre-Socratic Socrates. In The Clouds, 
Aristophanes subjects, so to speak, the pre-Socratic 
Socrates to a comic trial. In this comedy, the incredible 
limitations of the pre-Socratic Socrates are revealed: the 
first being his lack of prudence and self-knowledge; the 
second his inability to understand the needs of the city; 
the third his total misunderstanding of Eros (pp. 311-13).  
 Nietzsche takes up arguments similar to those of Aris-
tophanes to use against Plato’s Socrates: he criticizes the 
Platonic tradition of a Socratic, philosophical citizenship. 
But the traditional Socrates would seem to be completely 
free of the above-mentioned limitations: he is the cham-
pion of prudence and self-knowledge, the truly erotic 
man, the citizen par excellence, and the only real politi-
cian in Athens (p. 314)8. Nonetheless, this sort of citizen-
philosopher, who is the emblem of our Great Tradition, 
has been violently and irreversibly challenged: from 
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Nietzsche’s perspective, the very phenomenon of 
“Socrates” would actually be the most degenerated symp-
tom of decadence, since the philosopher as such does not 
believe in the gods of the city, that is, he does not take 
political life seriously9.  
 But which point of view is adopted by Nietzsche in his 
critique of Socrates? Nietzsche adopts the perspective of 
the tragic vision of the world or of the tragic vision of 
human life, going back to the “first” Aeschylus:10 he ad-
opts the perspective of a tragic poet. Aristophanes also 
stands for poetry, but he is a comedian. Both Aristo-
phanes and Nietzsche, however, claim to be disciples of 
the god Dionysus (p. 22)11. Two disciples of the god Dio-
nysus attack the philosopher par excellence, Socrates: 
What is the difference between these two critics? How are 
we to determine which of the two is more radical? Of 
course, we are dealing with two profoundly different his-
torical and political situations and, even more import-
antly, with the difference between the spirit of tragedy 
and the spirit of comedy. Only one thing seems to be cer-
tain: The Clouds provide us, as Allan Bloom claimed, 
with a “record, unparalleled in its detail and depth, of this 
first appearance of philosophy, and we can apprehend the 
natural, or at least primitive, responses to it, prior to phi-
losophy’s effect on the world. This provides a view of the 
beginning at a time when we may be witnessing the end, 
partly because we no longer know that beginning”12. 
 
 
2. Political responsibility and the philosophic way of 
life 
 
Strauss starts, therefore, from the beginning and asks 
whether political philosophy is possible and necessary to 
begin with. He asks the question “why political philoso-
phy?” We need to understand why Socrates brought phi-
losophy down to the city and to the household (p. 4). One 
thing seems clear: in The Clouds, the philosopher receives 
both a political critique and a political lesson. This com-
edy, however, poses some questions that can only be an-
swered by a careful reading of Aristophanes’ other co-
medies (p. 53), and, in a sense, the purpose of Socrates 
and Aristophanes is the perfect understanding of Aristo-
phanes’ political critique of the philosophical way of 
life13. 
 What is the thrust of this criticism? It can be stated as 
follows: The philosopher does not take the city and its 
gods seriously. In other words, the philosopher lacks pru-
dence because he questions what the city reveres as sa-
cred (pp. 48-49) and, therefore, exposes himself to the 
moral indignation of his fellow citizens. The philosopher 
is in danger of being persecuted (and eventually of being 
prosecuted). Moreover, his teachings can be misinter-
preted by corrupt men who may feel entitled to forget the 
precepts of morality and to act against them. For this rea-
son, the philosopher may be perceived by good and up-
standing citizens as an agent of disorder, as a threat to 
public order. 
 Socrates takes neither the city nor the conditions upon 
which social peace is based seriously – he ultimately fails 
to take the conditions for his own way of life seriously, 
which requires security and concentration. The phrontis-
terion is unable to secure its own political conditions of 
possibility. The Socratic school corrupts young people 
and estranges them from their families and the city, but is 
materially dependent on it and on individual acts of gen-
erosity and petty theft. This community of natural scien-
tists is exposed to the greatest danger when Socrates re-
veals the truth about the gods to Strepsiades. It is only 
Strepsiades’ intellectual slowness that prevents him from 
being immediately aware that Socratic atheism destroys 
the main pillar of justice: in fact, if Zeus does not exist, 
then there is no guarantee that superhuman punishment 
awaits those who transgress the most fundamental of pro-
hibitions (p. 19). 
 The prohibition of incest and the prohibition of patri-
cide are the fundamental pillars of political life or the life 
of every human community. Strauss defines these prohi-
bitions (along with the need for divine worship) as un-
conditional requirements of the city (p. 304): these are the 
sacred restraints that underpin every closed or political 
society. But from the point of view of the pre-Socratic 
Socrates, Zeus, far from being a god, does not even exist 
(p. 19). Revealing the truth about the gods seems more 
urgent to him than respecting the basis of his fellow citi-
zens’ moral beliefs. For this reason, Aristophanes, as a 
poet who knows the limits and cravings of the human 
soul, comically chastises the philosopher for his superfi-
ciality.  
 When Strepsiades realizes the effects of Socratic edu-
cation on his beloved and spoiled son Pheidippides, he is 
shocked and becomes angry: it is his moral indignation 
which literally brings down the Socratic school. We might 
say that the recommendation of the clouds to Strepsiades 
also applies to the philosopher: the new goddesses main-
tain that “the only thing that matters is the fear of the 
gods”. Aristophanes seems to suggest that his friend 
Socrates publicly respect what is sacred to the city; he 
should, in a sense, pay lip service to the gods of the city. 
In this sense the poet tells Socrates to take the gods of the 
city seriously because, for good citizens, the only thing 
that matters is the fear of the gods (p. 44). 
 
 
3. Socratic unbelief and the science of nature 
 
 But why does Socrates fail to take the gods of the city 
seriously? Why are natural science and the debunking of 
sacred things so closely related? As we know, Strauss 
writes that, for Socrates, “Zeus, far from being a god, 
does not even exist” (p. 19). This is the Straussian reading 
of Clouds v. 367 in which Socrates literally states: “What 
Zeus? Don’t be silly. Zeus does not exist”. From the 
philosophical point of view, belief in the existence of 
Zeus is equivalent to leresis, empty talk and nonsense. 
This is not so far from the spirit of Farabi, who defines 
divine promises of happiness in the afterlife as “ravings 
and old women’s tales”14. 
 I think there are at least two reasons which may ex-
plain Socrates’ unbelief. The first is as follows: Socrates 
does not take Zeus seriously firstly because Zeus is far 
from being a god (p. 33); but this would mean, at least, 
that Socrates knows what a god is. We are not offered any 
explicit definition here, but we know that, according to 
the poets, the gods are models of the blessed life. In a 
sense, Socrates seems to assume this basic tenet, but from 
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his philosophical point of view, Zeus cannot be a model 
of the blessed life, that is, a god, because of his childish 
indifference to learning (p. 33).  Far from being a god, 
Zeus proves, indeed, to be a childish being. He is in actu-
ality nothing but a proud and whimsical tyrant15. Accord-
ing to Strauss’ Socrates, the model represented by Zeus 
does not live up to the ideal of a perfect being: the denial 
of the divinity of Zeus is implied by the assertion of the 
primacy of contemplative life16. 
 We cannot underestimate this statement; for, in order 
to deny the divinity of Zeus, it is not necessary at all to 
prove that Zeus does not exist. If Zeus were to exist, a 
wise man such as Socrates would not want to imitate him. 
The statement which indicates the childish character of 
Zeus completes the elenchos with which the Unjust 
Speech destroyed the Just Speech; Zeus is deprived both 
of justice and bliss. It is easy to conclude that an unjust 
and unhappy superhuman being cannot actually be recog-
nized and revered as a god because he bears a closer re-
semblance to a human tyrant17. We could even assume 
that he is a powerful being with certain characteristics and 
so on, but this does not show that he would be an authori-
tative model which can legitimately raise a claim to imita-
tion or obedience. 
 A second reason why Socrates does not take the gods 
of the city seriously seems to be the fact that, as he main-
tains, Zeus does not even exist or, to put it more precisely, 
Zeus does not exist in nature. Here the other aspect of the 
problem of Socrates comes to the forefront. In this regard, 
it seems useful to turn to some important pages of Natural 
Right and History, especially the first part of the chapter 
on The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right. We learn from 
Strauss’ account that the discovery of nature is the work 
of philosophy and that the discovery of nature is possible 
when the authority of nomos is called into question. This 
means that nature needs to be discovered, and that there is 
something that hides it. According to Strauss, authorita-
tive decisions hide nature: in plain English, authority 
hides nature18. 
 The philosopher as such is an enemy of authority as 
such, but this is not a form of political rebellion: it is a 
necessity in the same way that it is necessary to dig up the 
moly in order to see its white root (cf. Hom. Od. X 303-
306). The discovery of nature is guided by the distinction 
between hearsay and seeing with one’s own eyes, and the 
distinction between what is man-made and what is not 
man-made. Nonetheless, despite the theoretical intention 
that drives the philosopher, the discovery of nature is 
never politically innocent. In fact, the discovery of nature 
implies a break with the authority of ancestral laws, or 
with the authority of divine law. In other words, the phi-
losopher must reject the gods of the city and refuse to ac-
knowledge as sacred what the city holds to be sacred.  
 As Strauss writes: “Originally, the questions concern-
ing the first things and the right way are answered before 
they are raised. They are answered by authority. For auth-
ority as the right of human beings to be obeyed is essen-
tially derivative from law, and law is originally nothing 
other than the way of life of the community”19. The law 
answers the questions about the first things even before 
these questions are actually raised. The law, and espe-
cially the positive divine law which is revealed by God or 
by the gods, makes it pointless to search for the truth 
about the first things.  
 But why is it necessary that the law answer the ques-
tion regarding the first things with authoritarian deci-
sions? I believe the answer is as follows. Strauss writes: 
“Man cannot live without having thoughts about the first 
things, and, it was presumed, he cannot live well without 
being united with his fellows by identical thoughts about 
the first things, i.e., without being subject to authoritative 
decisions concerning the first things: it is the law that 
claims to make manifest the first things or ‘what is’”20. 
The point is that the multiplicity of nomoi, or the multi-
plicity of ancestral laws that contradict each other, espe-
cially on the issues regarding the first things, requires the 
suspension of judgment. Only a rational demonstration 
can determine which of the many ancestral laws tells the 
truth; therefore, from the philosophical perspective, auth-
ority as such no longer represents the criterion that guides 
choice: the discovery of nature leads the philosopher to 
distinguish between physis and nomos, and then to recog-
nize the customs and ancestral laws of various peoples as 
conventions. 
 In Socrates and Aristophanes, the distinction between 
physis and nomos is decisive for Strauss’ argument (pp. 
140, 143). If nomos is sheer convention, then nomos is not 
part of those things that exist by nature, nor is it part of 
what is generated, directly or indirectly, by the first 
causes. Nomos, like all artificial or conventional things, 
depends directly on man. The greater dignity of natural 
things, or divine things21, as compared to nomos, is due to 
the fact that law presupposes nature, but nature does not 
presuppose the law: nature is the condition of law. Nature 
exists in the fullest sense, for nature is eternal, and law 
appears to be a mere human construct22. Socrates, who as 
a philosopher takes his bearings from the discovery of na-
ture and the devaluation of what does not exist in nature 
or by nature, cannot see Zeus anywhere. All those phe-
nomena which are traced back to the activity of Zeus are 
actually phenomena with natural causes. Rain, lightning 
and thunder are natural phenomena produced by natural 
causes. Socrates has to deny the existence of Zeus be-
cause there is no record, in his empirical observations, of 
a superhuman being who speaks, thinks and exerts a will 
(pp. 19, 21).  
 
 
4. The political conditions of the contemplative life 
 
 At this point, the objection of Aristophanes, as I see it, 
steps in. As is shown by the behavior of his comic heroes 
or spokesmen, Aristophanes does not believe that the tra-
ditional gods exist in nature; therefore, to this extent, the 
comic poet agrees with Socrates. Trigaius, the hero of 
Peace, is not afraid of the punishment of Zeus (p. 155); 
Mnesilochus, Euripides’ father-in-law in the Thesmopho-
riazusai, knows that only human authorities can punish 
him (p. 225); Blepyrus, hero of Pluto, or Wealth, does not 
hesitate to challenge the father of the gods in order to re-
store Pluto’s sight (p. 291); Pisthetaerus, the superhuman 
founder of the Birds, dethrones Zeus and obtains his abso-
lute power over gods and men (pp. 163, 188-89). The 
heroes of Aristophanes behave with full awareness of the 
weakness of Zeus, who cannot actually punish anyone. 
A LESSON IN POLITICS 
 9 
 
His weakness seems to be the comic equivalent of his 
nonexistence (p. 143): only men who believe in Zeus can 
punish other men in the name of Zeus. Zeus has no power 
to punish anyone, and requires the assistance of man. But 
what constitutes, then, the difference between Socrates 
and Aristophanes on the issue of Zeus? Aristophanes 
would say: “of course, Zeus does not exist in nature, but 
he exists by convention. And this convention is something 
you’d better not dismantle so irresponsibly”. Socrates 
radically devalues convention, or nomos, because he 
looks only at nature. The greater dignity of physis com-
pared to nomos becomes for the philosopher a greater 
epistemological and axiological dignity as well, but the 
perspective of the citizen turns this axiological hierarchy 
upside down. By not taking the city seriously, Socrates 
fails to understand the importance of nomos and the 
fundamental role played by the belief in God or in the 
gods23. 
 Aristophanes knows that Zeus does not exist in nature, 
but he also knows that the actions of men who believe in 
Zeus have a real impact, for the actions of believers are 
just as real as those natural phenomena which Socrates 
observes. Opinions about the gods rule the world of hu-
man affairs, not the world of nature, but the world of hu-
man affairs is the world to which Socrates is necessarily 
bound by the simple fact of being a human being, even if 
he lives as if he were an Epicurean god. The comic poet 
compels us to reflect on this great misunderstanding on 
the part of those who lead a philosophic way of life.  
 The criticism of Aristophanes is not the criticism of 
someone whom we would define today as a theocon. In a 
remarkable passage, Strauss says that both Socrates and 
Aristophanes belong to the same species of man, although 
to two different subspecies (p. 46, cf. p. 17). The poet and 
the unpolitical philosopher are perfectly and necessarily 
distinct from one another; nevertheless they seem to share 
something very important. If we abstract from the specific 
difference between the poet and the unpolitical philoso-
pher, and even if we abstract from the rivalry between 
these two forms of wisdom, we can see that in both cases 
we are dealing with human beings that Strauss would 
characterize as “nonconformists, people who are prepared 
to stand alone, to fight alone, ‘rugged individualists’”24. 
Both the poet and the philosopher stand above and be-
yond the city (p. 77). Both of them reach a happiness that 
puts them above the city, an essentially private happi-
ness25, which is not directly determined by the regime and 
by the laws that govern the world of human affairs.  
 There is a statement in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy 
that seems to describe exactly the specific difference be-
tween poet and philosopher: 
 
Auch der theoretische Mensch hat ein unendliches Genügen am 
Vorhandenen, wie der Künstler […] Wenn nämlich der Künstler 
bei jeder Enthüllung der Wahrheit immer nur mit verzückten 
Blicken an dem hängen bleibt, was auch jetzt, nach der Enthül-
lung, noch Hülle bleibt, genießt und befriedigt sich der theore-
tische Mensch an der abgeworfenen Hülle und hat sein höchstes 
Lustziel in dem Prozess einer immer glücklichen, durch eigene 
Kraft gelingenden Enthüllung26. 
 
This statement would fit perfectly in the context of the 
Straussian comment on the comedies of Aristophanes. A 
character like Dikaiopolis shows us the perfect happiness 
of the comic poet who manages to enjoy himself and his 
art, thinking only about himself, focusing solely on him-
self. Seen in this way, he does not seem to be different 
from the pre-Socratic Socrates, who dedicates himself en-
tirely to the study of divine or natural things, to the con-
templative life. Even this Socrates, like the poet, is totally 
focused on himself and his own happiness.  
 As Nietzsche maintains in Morgenröthe, the philoso-
pher and the poet are two examples of the contemplative 
life27, for both of them reach a perfect bliss thanks to an 
unpolitical way of life (p. 74). In this way the poet and the 
unpolitical philosopher are similar. Thanks to this affinity, 
the unpolitical philosopher can learn from the poet how to 
defend himself before the tribunal of the city: is not Di-
kaiopolis’ apology before the Acharnians indeed the 
model of any possible defense of a philosopher before the 
tribunal of the city (pp. 60-67)? The poet, unlike the pre-
Socratic philosopher, knows the nature of the city, be-
cause he takes his bearings from what is first for us. As 
becomes clear from Plato’s Symposium, where Socrates 
states that Aristophanes divides his time between Diony-
sus and Aphrodite (177d7-e3), the comic poet begins with 
that alogon which is the foundation of the family and 
therefore the foundation of the city (pp. 49, 173). The un-
political philosopher, blind to the needs of Eros, fails to 
understand the basic needs of the multitude. Firstly, he 
remains blind to the desire for beautiful and imperishable 
superhuman beings (pp. 82-83); secondly, the unpolitical 
philosopher has no feeling for what is naturally festive 
and golden, such as the pleasures associated with the rural 
world of comedy: women, wine, food, laughter, singing 
and dancing together in the popular festivals in the coun-
try (pp. 173, 307). Lastly, the pre-Socratic philosopher 
cannot understand the negative side of the erotic soul of 
the multitude. Not without some exaggeration, we might 
say that patricide and incest are the erotic crimes par ex-
cellence. The pre-Socratic philosopher failed to realize 
the danger he was courting by denying the foundation on 
which the sacredness of the prohibition of incest and pat-
ricide is established. This ignorance makes the pre-
Socratic philosopher unable to appreciate the role played 
by the belief in God or in the gods.  
 
 
5. A lesson in political prudence 
 
Therefore, only an external constraint can coerce the un-
political philosopher to involve himself in human affairs, 
and therefore to cross-examine the most authoritative 
opinions that govern the world of human affairs: 
 
Philosophy […] was concerned only negatively, only acciden-
tally, with political things. Socrates himself, the founder of po-
litical philosophy, was famous as a philosopher before he ever 
turned to political philosophy. Left to themselves, the philoso-
phers would not descend again to the “cave” of political life, but 
would remain outside in what they considered “the island of the 
blessed” – contemplation of the truth28. 
 
This means that only an external necessity, the clash with 
some non-philosophical instance, can force the unpolitical 
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philosopher to reflect on the conditions and the dangers of 
his philosophical way of life. In this sense, the origin of 
political philosophy is due to a compulsion to self-
knowledge, and thanks to this constraint, the pre-Socratic 
philosopher understands that the political community, or 
nomos, is the necessary condition of the philosophical 
way of life, the life according to nature29. But the city is 
not naturally inclined to philosophy; the city is pro-
foundly indifferent, if not hostile, to philosophy. Aristo-
phanes makes us clearly understand this fact when Pisthe-
taerus kicks Meton out of the city of the birds (pp. 175, 
182). Meton is the character most similar to Socrates. Phi-
losophy is not the “one thing needful” to the city. The city 
does not gladly bear someone who is, at the same time, 
useless and dangerous, even less gladly someone who 
might pose as an Epicurean god, utterly blissful and un-
concerned. From the philosophical point of view, the city 
is primarily a means of survival. 
 We can therefore plainly state the strictly political 
character of Aristophanes’ lesson. Commonly, Socrates is 
held to be a champion of phronesis, that is, “that kind of 
knowledge which is inseparable from ‘moral virtue’, i.e. 
goodness of character or of the habit of choosing, just as 
moral virtue is inseparable from prudence”30. Can we say 
the same of the Socrates who has been taught by the 
comical poet? The Socrates chastened by the clouds does 
not recant his atheism and his selfishness. We may sur-
mise that he understood the necessity of respecting (at 
least publicly) piety and justice, and therefore his political 
wisdom would be but a wary, utilitarian approach to 
things political, rather than a moral concern for the com-
mon good. 
 In Birds, v. 376, we read that the wise learn how to be 
cautious from the enemy (p. 165). The word in question is 
not phronesis but eulabeia; this kind of circumspection 
recommends that the philosopher deal cautiously with 
what is sacred to the city. This prudence is a kind of noble 
fear.31 Is this the same kind of circumspection that gives 
its name to the seal of Spinoza, caute?32 Does not the wise 
Socrates learn how to be cautious from the friendly 
enemy Aristophanes? The lesson of the comic poet may 
be summarized by this fundamental rule of thumb: “Don’t 
separate wisdom from moderation”, where moderation is 
not a virtue of thought, but of speech33. In a sense, Aristo-
phanes shows that the philosopher should conceive an 
exoteric teaching, or a better one34. 
 It is not possible to determine whether Socrates had 
personally put this lesson into practice. Certainly, accord-
ing to Strauss, Xenophon and Plato did as they handed the 
figure – until now traditional – of the citizen-philosopher 
Socrates down to history. The idealization of Socrates is 
the philosophical politics of his disciples (p. 314). Going 
back to The Clouds of Aristophanes, and reopening the 
quarrel between poetry and philosophy, Strauss makes us 
understand why political philosophy, understood as po-
litical action in defense of philosophy35, has been (and 
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